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INTRODUCTION
Throughout 2005-2006, the world's major powers engaged in difficult
negotiations over the best way to respond to Iran's nuclear ambitions. Part
of their difficulty stemmed from uncertainty over basic facts. Negotiators
have not known for certain whether Iran has been developing nuclear
weapons or just a nuclear power capability.1  They have also been
uncertain about the implications of various response strategies. Regarding
one response, however, they need not have lost any time: international law
clearly prohibits the use of force against Iran under the facts prevailing in
late 2006. The use of force should come "off the table," as diplomats
search for a constructive way forward.2
t Robert and Marion Short Chair in Law, Notre Dame Law School
IJD expected 2007, Notre Dame Law School; with thanks for research assistance to
Lenore VanderZee, JD, LLM expected 2007, Notre Dame Law School
1. See infra Part III; see also Sam Gardiner, Et Maintenant En Avant: Preemption and
the Planning for Iran, 57 SYRACUSE L. REv. 443 (2007); Steven E. Miller, Proliferation
Gamesmanship: Iran and the Politics of Nuclear Confrontation, 57 SYRACUSE L. REv. 549
(2007). See also Seymour M. Hersh, The Next Act; Is a Damaged Administration Less
Likely to Attack Iran, or More?, NEW YORKER, Nov. 27, 2006, at 94 [hereinafter The Next
Act]; Julian Borger, US Iran Intelligence "is incorrect", GUARDIAN, Mar. 5, 2007,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/iran/story/0,,2019235,00.html; Elaine Sciolino et al., U.N.
Agency Says Iran Falls Short on Nuclear Data, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2006.
2. According to the journalist Seymour Hersh, the use of armed force has been very
much on the table, including the use of a tactical nuclear bomb. See Seymour Hersh, Last
Stand; The Military's Problem With the President's Iran Policy, NEW YORKER, July 10,
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The law governing the use of force is found in the United Nations
(UN) Charter, in customary international law, and in the general principles
of law. The rules emanating from these sources generally prohibit the use
of force in international relations except in response to a significant armed
attack or with Security Council authorization. Even where one of these
exceptions permits a resort to armed force, the use of force must be
necessary and proportional. Bombing Iranian nuclear research sites would
be neither.
Under these rules, no use of military force can be justified against Iran
for carrying out nuclear research. The great legal and moral imperative to
preserve the peace requires finding alternative responses short of force in
dealing with a situation like the one presented by Iran. The United States,
the European Union, Russia, China, and many other states want Iran to
comply with Security Council resolutions demanding that it stop enriching
uranium and permit verification that it has done so. 3 Iran is obligated under
international law to comply with Council resolutions.4 By the same token,
those states concerned with Iran's nuclear program must also comply with
international law and its prohibition on the use of force in how they
respond to Iran.
This article focuses on the law regulating the use of force in the
context of the Iranian nuclear situation in late 2006. Part I recounts certain
salient facts that underlie the legal analysis. Part II lays out the classic
legal principles on the use of force. Part III applies those principles in the
case of Iran. We conclude that while it would be unlawful for Iran to
acquire nuclear weapons, bombing Iran to prevent this would equally
violate fundamental rules banning the use of force.
I. IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
Iran is a non-nuclear party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 5
2006, at 42, available at http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/060710fafact;
Seymour Hersh, The Iran Plans; Would President Bush Go to War to Stop Tehran from
Getting the Bomb?, NEW YORKER, Apr. 17, 2006, at 30, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/060417fa-fact. See also Seymour Hersh,
The Redirection; Is the Administration's New Policy Benefitting Our Enemies in the War on
Terrorism?, NEW YORKER, Mar 5, 2007, at 52, 57.
3. See S.C. Res. 1696, U.N. Doc S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006), S.C. Res. 1737, U.N.
Doc S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006).
4. See U.N. Charter art. 25. See also, Press Release, Security Council, Security
Council Demands Iran Suspend Uranium Enrichment by 31 August or Face Possible
Economic, Diplomatic Sanctions, U.N. Doc. SC/8792 (July 31, 2006). In late 2006, Iran's
primary violation of international law with respect to its nuclear program was its failure to
comply with S.C. Res. 1696.
5. Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483,
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As such, it is bound not to develop nuclear weapons, but may engage in
peaceful nuclear activities. It may, for example, build nuclear power
plants. Iran has announced an intention to do just that, but in February
2006, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of
Governors resolved that Iran suspend "all enrichment-related and
reprocessing activities" in light of its finding that "Iran resumed uranium
conversion activities at its Isfahan facility on 8 August 2005 and took steps
to resume enrichment activities on 10 January 2006.' '6 The Board
requested that Iran "reconsider its position in relation to confidence-
building measures," and provide "credible assurances regarding the
absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran." 7 A report,
also issued in February 2006, by the IAEA Director General revealed
certain reasons for concern, including the discovery of an Iranian
procedural handbook outlining aspects of the "the fabrication of nuclear
weapon components." 8 In addition, the report cited a lack of transparency
regarding "the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear programme" after three
years of intensive IAEA verification activity.
9
The Board subsequently voted to report Iran to the UN Security
Council given the "absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear program is
exclusively for peaceful purposes resulting from the history of
concealment."' 0 In Resolution 1696 (July 2006), the Security Council
demanded that Iran "take the steps required by the IAEA Board of
Governors... which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively
peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and ... suspen[d] ... all [of its]
enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and
development, to be verified by the IAEA."' 1 The Council gave Iran until
729 U.N.T.S. 169.
6. See Int'l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Board of Governors Res., at 2, Doc.
GOV/2006/14 (Feb. 4, 2006) [hereinafter IAEA Bd. of Governors Res.].
7. Id. at 3.
8. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of
Iran, Report by the Director General, at 4-5, Doc. GOV/2006/15, (Feb. 27, 2006)
[hereinafter IAEA Director General Report]. Though the report is dated February 27, 2006,
it was only de-restricted on March 8, 2006. Id. at 1.
9. Id. at 11. The Report goes on to stipulate that transparency, in this case, implies that
Iran should actively cooperate with the IAEA and provide access to materials,
documentation, military-owned workshops and R&D centers. Id.
10. Elaine Sciolino et al., Iran's Nuclear Challenge: The Resolution; Nuclear Panel
Votes to Report Tehran to U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006, at 1.
11. Press Release, United Nations Security Council, Security Council, in Presidential
Statement, Underlines Importance of Iran's Re-Establishing Full, Sustained Suspension of
Uranium Enrichment Activities, Calls on Iran to Take Steps Required by IAEA Board of
Governors; Requests Report from IAEA Director General in 30 Days, U.N. Doc. SC/8679
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the end of August 2006, to suspend uranium enrichment and permit IAEA
verification. Iran missed the 31 August deadline.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW'S RULES ON THE USE OF FORCE
The purpose of international law, like all law, is to allow human
beings to live peacefully in community. Modem international law
originated in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia, treaties ending the bloody
Thirty Years War in Europe. The treaties laid down certain principles
designed to prevent new conflicts and instituted means to enforce them,
including collective action against wrongdoers and a requirement to
employ negotiation or arbitration before resort to force. 12 By 1945, these
basic principles had matured to become the general prohibition on the use
of force by states found in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the United
Nations Security Council, designed to enforce the prohibition. 13 States
have from time-to-time challenged the Charter regime restricting the use of
force. Yet, the international community has repeatedly re-confirmed its
support. It did so by an overwhelming vote of confidence in the Charter as
written during the 2005 World Summit in New York.
14
At the heart of the Charter regime is Article 2(4), a general prohibition
on the right of states to use armed force. 15 The Charter provides two
exceptions to this prohibition. Article 51 permits individual and collective
self-defense, 16 and Articles 39 and 42 provide for the Security Council's
right to authorize force in the face of a "threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression."' 17 Numerous decisions of the International
(Mar. 29, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8679.doc.htm.
12. See ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 117 (1953);
see also, Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, in I ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
ORGANIZATION 3 (1984).
13. See U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
14. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, para. 79, U.N. Doc. AJRES/60/1
(Oct. 24, 2005).
15. U.N. Charter art. 2(4): "All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
16. U.N. Charter art. 51:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of
this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
17. U.N. Charter art. 39: "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
500 [Vol. 57:497
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Court of Justice ("ICJ"), resolutions of the Security Council and General
Assembly, and official government statements have acknowledged that
states are bound by these rules, interpreted in plain terms. Of particular
importance in the Iran context are the 1981 Security Council condemnation
of Israel's bombing of an Iraqi nuclear power plant, 18 and the ICJ's
advisory opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.
19
It is understandable that states have supported these rules for over
sixty years. Article 2(4)'s general prohibition on the use of force aims at
fulfilling the major purpose of the UN, namely the UN Charter's aim "to
ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that
armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest... ."2o The
Charter has succeeded in creating a strong norm against the use of force.
Article 2(4)'s general prohibition is modified only by a limited right to use
force in self-defense articulated in Article 51,21 and by the Security
Council's right in Article 39 to "determine the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and authority to "maintain
or restore international peace." 22 The Council's right to authorize force is
thus broader than a state's right to use force in self-defense. States have
only "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed
attack occurs." 23 Dinstein emphasizes that "UN Member States are barred
by the Charter from exercising self-defence in response to a mere threat of
force."
24
It is noteworthy that, even if Iran is in possession of nuclear
technology in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty ("NPT"), mere
possession of nuclear weapons does not constitute an unlawful threat to use
force, let alone an armed attack in the terms of Article 5 1.25 The ICJ
addressed this issue in the 1996 advisory opinion Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons and concluded that mere possession of nuclear
weapons did not necessarily violate the Charter or general principles of
international law. 26 Whether nuclear weapons pose a "'threat' contrary to
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security."
18. See infra, pp. 513-14.
19. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226 (July 8). See infra p. 503.
20. U.N. Charter pmbl.
21. Id.
22. Id. art. 39.
23. Id. art. 51.
24. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 186 (4th ed. 2005).
25. See generally Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226.
26. Id. at 266.
2007]
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[the UN Charter], depends upon whether the... force envisaged would be
directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State,
or against the Purposes of the United Nations or whether... it would
necessarily violate the principles of necessity and proportionality.
'" 27
Indeed, "[i]n making its decision, the ICJ emphasized the tension between
the emerging custom-prohibiting the manufacture, possession, and use of
nuclear weapons and represented by current non-proliferation treaties on
one hand-and the continuing practice of nuclear deterrence on the
other."
28
For some scholars, the Court's decision in the Nuclear Weapons Case
is hardly relevant, because, despite the plain words of Article 51, they
believe that force may be used in the absence of any evidence of an armed
attack occurring. 29 They believe that a right to pre-emptive force existed in
customary international law prior to the adoption of the Charter in 1945
and continues to be open to states in the Article's reference to "inherent"
right of self-defense. This interpretation requires reading out express terms
of Article 51 in particular "if an attack armed occurs." Such a contorted
reading is not necessary if one accepts that the "inherent" right of self-
defense persists, but since 1945 has been limited to responding to an armed
attack. The negotiating history of the Charter makes clear that this is the
meaning the drafters intended.3 °
What we find in general international law, beyond the Charter, with
respect to the right to use force in self-defense, are the principles of
necessity and proportionality. In the 1840s, the United States and Great
Britain corresponded about a use of force on the Canadian-U.S. border that
involved the sinking of the ship Caroline. U.S. Secretary of State Daniel
Webster described a legitimate use of force as one that is not "unreasonable
or excessive," but rather "limited by. . . necessity," the necessity being
"instant, overwhelming, [and] leaving no choice of means, and no moment
of deliberation." 31  This requirement of necessity and its companion
proportionality continue in force today. In addition to a lawful basis in the
Charter, states using force must show that force is necessary and can be
carried out while respecting the principle of proportionality. States must be
27. Id. at 246-47.
28. See Kelly J.'Malone, Comment, Preemptive Strikes and the Korean Nuclear Crisis:
Legal and Political Limitations on the Use of Force, 12 PAC. RiM. L. & POL'Y J. 807, 827
(2003).
29. See, e.g., John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 729 (2004).
30. MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 210-19
(2005).
31. See R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 89
(1938).
[Vol. 57:497
The Ban on the Bomb-And Bombing
able to show that force can achieve a legitimate objective as set out in the
Charter. If they can make the necessity showing they must also show that
the method of force used will not result in disproportionate loss of life and
destruction compared to the value of the objective. Necessity and
proportionality are not expressly mentioned in the Charter, but Judith
Gardam provides impressive authority for their existence as rules of
customary international law or general principles of law. 32 As the ICJ said
in the Nuclear Weapons Case: "there is a 'specific rule whereby self-
defence would warrant only measures which are proportional to the armed
attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in customary
international law.' This dual condition applies equally to Article 51 of the
Charter, whatever the means of force employed. 33
In sum, today, unless a state has received previous authorization from
the UN Security Council to use force, it must: (a) be the victim of a
significant armed attack; (b) "the armed attack must either be underway or
the victim of an attack must have at least clear and convincing evidence
that more attacks are planned;" 34 (c) the state being targeted should "be
responsible for the significant armed attack in progress or planned;" 35 (d)
the force used must be necessary and proportional in the context of
defense. 36 Even with Security Council authorization, a preemptive strike
on nuclear facilities would not be a "legitimate target[] for an armed action
in self-defence.
'" 37
State practice since the adoption of the Charter further supports this
restatement of the rules. When Israel used military force in response to
threats not amounting to armed attack in both the Suez Crisis and the attack
on Iran's Osirak nuclear reactor, its actions were condemned.38 The United
States used force pre-emptively during both the Cuban Missile Crisis in
32. See generally JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF
FORCE BY STATES (2004). See also Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 196-97,
para. 74, (Nov. 6) (citing Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14,
103, para. 194, (June 27)) [hereinafter "Nicaragua"]; Christopher Greenwood, The
Relationship Between jus ad bellum andjus in bello, 9 REv. INT'L STUD. 221, 223 (1983)).
33. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
at 245 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 94, para. 176).
34. Mary Ellen O'Connell, Lawful Self-Defense to Terrorism, 63 U. Pr. L. REv. 889,
889-90 (2002); see also DINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 187. Professor Dinstein argues that "the
right to self-defence.., can be invoked in response to an armed attack as soon as it becomes
evident to the victim State that the attack is in the process of being mounted." Id.
35. O'Connell, Lawful Self-Defense to Terrorism, supra note 34, at 890.
36. Id.
37. Oil Platforms, 2003 I.C.J. 161, 196-98, paras. 74-76.
38. For a discussion of these and other relevant cases, see Mary Ellen O'Connell, The
Myth of Pre-emptive Self-Defense, Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Terrorism Taskforce, August 2002,
http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf (visited April 14, 2007).
2007]
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1962 and against Iraq in 2003. In both cases, it asserted that it had
authorization from organizations, the Organization of American States and
the United Nations Security Council, respectively. The United States has
not, to date, acted under the right asserted in the 2002 and 2006 National
Security Strategies to use force to pre-empt an attack. Its actions, therefore,
could have little impact on modifying the rules discussed above. Rather,
United States practice has more consistently supported an application of the
plain meaning of Article 51. In 1956, Israel attacked Egypt in an action
coordinated with the United Kingdom and France, following Egypt's
nationalization of the Suez Canal. Israel argued that it had the right to use
force in anticipatory self-defense, but it was widely condemned, including
by the Eisenhower Administration.
39
The United States itself debated taking pre-emptive military action, in
the absence of an imminent attack, in 1962, when U.S. intelligence
agencies discovered that the Soviet Union would soon have the ability to
launch missiles from the island nation of Cuba. Some officials urged
bombing missile sites in Cuba and the ships delivering rockets.
40
Bombing, however, would violate international law. During a subsequent
Security Council debate the delegate from Ghana provided the classical
legal analysis:
Are there grounds for the argument that such action is justified in
exercise of the inherent right of self-defense? Can it be contended that
there was, in the words of a former American Secretary of State whose
reputation as a jurist in this field is widely accepted, "a necessity of self-
defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no
moment for deliberation"?... My delegation does not think so, for as I
have said earlier, inconvertible proof is not yet available as to the
offensive character of the military developments in Cuba. Nor can it be
argued that the threat was of such a nature as to warrant action on the
scale that has so far been taken, prior to a reference to this Council.41
Indeed, as these comments indicate, the Cuban threat fell short of any
definition of armed attack. The United States decided against an air attack
39. Louis HENKIN ET AL., RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE 45 (1989).
40. See ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE
ROLE OF LAW 64-66 (1974) (The Kennedy administration was hesitant to call the installation
of rockets an "armed attack" to trigger the right to act in self-defense under Article 51
because it would have signaled "that the United States did not take the legal issues involved
very seriously, that in its view the situation was to be governed by national discretion not
international law.")
41. Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the Use of Force, 26 WASH. Q. 89, 94
(2003) (quoting Mr. Quaison-Sackey, UN Doc S/PV.1024:51 (1962)).
[Vol. 57:497
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because it would be a "Pearl Harbor in reverse," and because, "a first strike
was inconsistent with American values." 42 The Soviet Ambassador to the
United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, would later write that "'[t]hose days
revealed the mortal danger of a direct armed confrontation between two
great powers, a confrontation headed off on the brink of war thanks to both
sides' timely and agonizing realization of the disastrous consequences."
43
Instead of an air attack, a naval blockade was used. It was called a
"quarantine" since the term "blockade" had been used for centuries to refer
to an act considered a casus belli.4 The Administration knew, however,
regardless of what it was named, interdicting Soviet ships would still be
considered an unlawful use of force under the Charter, so the
Administration sought authorization. Knowing the Soviet Union would
veto such a request to the Security Council, the U.S. went to the
Organization of American States (OAS) instead.45 The OAS, however, had
no authority to authorize a use of force in the absence of an armed attack.46
Still, U.S. officials felt this was a more acceptable violation than an
outright unilateral use of force.4 7 They even thought it preferable to go to
the OAS than to argue that the placement of weapons in Cuba constituted
an armed attack for purposes of Article 51.48 Apparently, there was real
concern about establishing an expansive interpretation of the phrase "if an
armed attack occurs."
49
In 1981, however, Israel argued for just such an expansive
interpretation. On June 7, 1981, it bombed a nuclear power reactor under
construction at Osirak, Iraq. Prime Minister Menachem Begin justified the
attack by citing Israeli intelligence reports indicating the reactor could go
into operation as early as July 1, 1981.50 Iraq was a state party to the NPT
42. Rick Klein, Kennedy Book Blasts Bush, 'Preventive War,' BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 5,
2006, at Al.
43. Bart M. J. Szewczyk, Pre-emption, Deterrence, and Self-Defence: A Legal and
Historical Assessment, 18 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT'L AFF. 119, 121 n.6 (2005) (quoting
ANATOLY DOBRYNIN, IN CONFIDENCE: Moscow's AMBASSADOR TO AMERICA'S SIX COLD
WAR PRESIDENTS (1962-1985) 93 (1995)).
44. See generally Quincy Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 546, 553-
56 (1963) [hereinafter Wright].
45. Id. at 557-58.
46. Id. at 557-59.
47. Id. at 557. "The main argument put forward by the United States to justify the
quarantine was that it was permitted by Articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty of 1947,
implemented by the Consultative Organ of the Organization of American States . I.." Id
48. Id. at 560-61.
49. See Chayes, supra note 40; see also THOMAS EHRLICH & MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE, 342-43 (1993). (Ehrlich was a lawyer in the
State Department assigned to work on Cuban missile crisis legal issues.)
50. Trudy Rubin, That Israeli Raid on the Iraqi Reactor: The Facts-and Deeper
20071
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and its nuclear installations had been inspected on a regular basis by the
IAEA. 51 The IAEA reported to the Security Council after the bombing that
it had found no evidence of diversion of material to a weapons program,
52
and that it planned once the reactor became operational, to place full-time
inspectors in Iraq, "which would have made any plutonium production
impossible." 53 Despite this report, Israel argued that it had the right to
strike Iranian nuclear facilities and thereby halt a potentially "fatal process
before it reaches completion." 54  The Council disagreed, voting
unanimously in Resolution 487 that the pre-emptive attack on the reactor
constituted action "in clear violation of... the norms of international
conduct" and "a serious threat to the entire safeguards regime of the [IAEA
and of the NPT]." 5 The U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN, Jeane
Kirkpatrick, observed that "the means Israel chose to quiet its fears about
the purposes of Iraq's nuclear program have hurt, and not helped, the peace
and security of the area .... Israeli action has damaged the regional
confidence that is essential for the peace process to go forward.",
56
Kirkpatrick stated that the bombing did not meet the test of necessity and
joined the resolution condemning it. In fact, bombing the Osirak reactor
may have exacerbated tensions in the region and apparently encouraged
Saddam Hussein to accelerate the Iraqi nuclear program given that, after
the incident, he called "upon any nation not wanting Arab nations
subjugated to foreign forces to develop nuclear weapons." 57 Thus, military
Issues, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 24, 1981, at 12. After the reactor entered operation,
"it would be impossible to bomb it without threatening Baghdad's population with
radiation." Id.; see also O'Connell, The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense, supra note 38, at
4-5.
51. U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2288th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2288 (June 19, 1981).
52. Id. at 14.
53. Richard Wilson, Incorrect, Incomplete, or Unreliable Information Can Lead to
Tragically Incorrect Decisions, http://physics.harvard.edu/-wilson/publications/OSIRAK(2)
(last visited Jan. 25, 2007) (emphasis in original). The Osirak "was a light water cooled
reactor explicitly designed to be unsuited for making plutonium." Id.
54. U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2288th mtg. at 53-55, UN Doc. S/PV.2280 (June 12, 1981)
(commentary of Yehuda Blum).
55. S.C. Res. 487, paras. 1, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (June 19, 1981). See also W.
Thomas Mallison & Sally V. Mallison, The Israeli Aerial Attack of June 7, 1981, Upon the
Iraqi Nuclear Reactor: Aggression or Self Defense?, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 417, 437-
41 (1982) (noting that the world community, including France, Italy, and the U.S.,
condemned-the use of force in anticipatory self-defense).
56. U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2288th mtg. at 16.
57. See Nuclear Threat Initiative, Iraq Biological Chronology: 1980-1989,
http://www.nti.org/e-research/profiles/Iraq/BiologicalU3889_3892.html (last visited Jan. 25,
2007). After the bombing of the Osirak reactor, Sadaam Hussein addressed his cabinet
saying the attack on the "Osirak ... nuclear reactor was not because it was allegedly
developing nuclear weapons but because Iraq is a front-line Arab nation showing progress
[Vol. 57:497506
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force may well have been counter-productive to achieving greater security
for Israel.
Twenty-two years later, when the United States, the United Kingdom,
and Australia invaded Iraq on March 19, 2003, they did not justify their use
of force on any expansive interpretation of self-defense. There is one
vague reference to "self-defense" in the U.S. letter to the Security Council,
but that letter and those of the U.K. and Australia generally emphasize that
the invasion was justified to enforce the Security Council resolutions
passed in 1990-1991, in the wake of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. It was
subsequently revealed that British legal officials had serious reservations
about this argument and had advised seeking new Security Council
authorization. 58  The United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia
could not secure that fresh authority, even after Colin Powell made his
now-infamous February 2003 presentation of evidence to the Security
Council that Iraq had developed weapons of mass destruction.
59
For purposes of understanding what the current law is on the use of
force, it is significant that the states invading Iraq did not try to argue they
had a right to use force pre-emptively, but rather that they had Security
Council authorization. As the ICJ said in the Nicaragua Case,
If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule,
but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications
contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the State's conduct
is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to
and developing its technology base." Id. (emphasis in original). There is evidence that, in
response to the attack, the Iraqi chemical weapons program was accelerated. See generally
id.; see also Timothy V. McCarthy & Jonathan B. Tucker, Saddam's Toxic Arsenal:
Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars, in PLANNING THE UNTHINKABLE 57
(Peter R. Lavoy et al. eds., 2000).
58. Richard Norton-Taylor, Revealed: The Government's Secret Legal Advice on the
Iraq War, GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 28, 2005, at 1. "The attorney general [Lord
Goldsmith] warned Mr. Blair that Britain might be able to argue it could go to war on the
basis of past UN resolutions, but only if there were 'strong factual grounds' that Iraq was
still in breach of its disarmament obligations." Id; see also Global Policy Forum, British
Attorney General's Advice to Blair on Legality of Iraq War, (Mar. 7, 2003),
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/document/2003/O307advice.htm. From the
full text of the Attorney General's memorandum to Blair: "In other words, we would need to
be able to demonstrate hard evidence of non-compliance and non-cooperation [to justify use
of force against Iraq]." Id. at para. 29. See also for analysis of resort to war in Iraq and
conclusion that it was unlawful, Sean Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92
GEO. L. REv. 173 (2005); Richard Falk, What Future.for the UN Charter System of War
Prevention?, 97 AJIL 607 (2003); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Addendum to Armed Force in
Iraq: Issues of Legality, INSIGHTS, April 2003, available at,
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh99a1.htm.
59. See Dafna Linzer, U.S. Deploys Slide Show to Press Case Against Iran, WASH.
POST, Sept. 14, 2005, at A7.
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confirm rather than to weaken the rule.
60
Even the 2006 United States National Security Strategy explains that
the U.S. invaded Iraq because "Saddam Hussein's continued defiance of 16
UNSC resolutions over 12 years, combined with his record of invading
neighboring countries, supporting terrorists, tyrannizing his own people,
and using chemical weapons, presented a threat we could no longer
ignore."61 With the reference to Security Council resolutions, the 2006
document cannot be cited as state practice with opinio juris supporting the
creation of a new rule of customary international law contrary to the
Charter or general principles. Indeed, even if it could be so cited, Article
2(4) is a principle ofjus cogens not subject to change in the same manner
as other rules of international law.
Rather than finding the terms of the Charter modified in any way in
late 2006, we find renewed support for them. At the fall 2005 UN World
Summit, the following statement was agreed:
We reaffirm that the relevant provisions of the Charter are sufficient to
address the full range of threats to international peace and security. We
further reaffirm the authority of the Security Council to mandate
coercive action to maintain and restore international peace and security.
We stress the importance of acting in accordance with the purposes and
principles of the Charter.
62
In addition, in fall 2006, it was widely acknowledged that measures
against North Korea for developing a nuclear weapon required Security
Council authorization. These measures have been far short of armed force.
Nevertheless, economic measures, stopping and searching ships, and the
like, have required Council authorization. 63 Plainly the use of military
force would as well.
The rules of the UN Charter, designed to keep the peace in the post-
World War II era, remain the law. No state may use force against another
unless it is acting in individual or collective self-defense to an actual armed
attack or with Security Council authorization. In addition, all uses of force
must be necessary and proportional.
60. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 98.
61. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 23 (2006).
62. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1 at para. 79.
63. Mary Ellen O'Connell, Ad Hoc War, in KRISENSICHERUNG UND HUMANITARER
SCHUTZ-CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION 405, 418-21 (2004).
Ambassador Bolton apparently changed his position from 2002 to 2003 when he argued that
post-9/11 the United States and its allies could stop and search shipping on the high seas
without consent under his "Proliferation Security Initiative." See id.
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III. INTERNATIONAL LAW'S RULES APPLIED TO IRAN
Iran may have aspirations to acquire nuclear weapons in violation of
its obligations under the NPT-though this remains unproven at the time of
this writing. 64 Acquiring weapons is unlawful and open to
countermeasures, but cannot give rise to a right of self-defense, meaning
attacking the territory of a state with significant force. Thus, there is
simply no right to bomb or invade Iran for attempting to acquire nuclear
weapons. Nor could the United States or other states justify bombing
Iranian nuclear research sites in response to Iranian support to militant
groups, incursions into Iraq, or similar conduct. If any of this conduct
actually gave rise to the right of self-defense, the response would have to
aim at ending the conduct triggering the right, not some other unlawful
conduct. Afortiori any use of force by the United States on the basis of
collective self-defense would be completely unlawful under the facts here.
In late 2006, the United States remained bound by the rule it primarily
created-the restriction on force except in the face of an armed attack.
The Security Council is also restricted by the principles of necessity
and proportionality in what it can authorize with respect to military force
against Iran. Experts doubt bombing can achieve the military objective of
halting the nuclear research program. Even if it could, to use force against
Iran with the aim of removing its nuclear program would require bombing
heavily populated areas all over the country. The inevitable death and
destruction could not be justified under the proportionality rule.
With respect to individual and collective self-defense, Professor
Maggs argues in another article in this volume that Iran is engaged in many
unlawful uses of force and that these give rise to the right of the United
States to attack it in collective self-defense with Israel or Iraq.65 Under the
test of the Nicaragua Case, however, states are restricted from using force
in collective self-defense unless there is a significant armed attack (not a
mere border incident), the attacked state is legally responsible for the
armed attack (not just a financier and/or trainer), the victim of the attack
formally requests assistance in collective self-defense, and the states
involved report to the Security Council that they are acting in self-
defense.
66
One example Professor Maggs supplies as a basis for collective self-
64. See supra note 1.
65. Gregory Maggs, How the United States Might Justify a Preemptive Strike on a
Rogue Nation's Nuclear Weapon Development Facilities under the U.N. Charter, 57
SYRACUSE L. REv. 465 (2007).
66. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 101-04, 64-65, 120-23.
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defense concerns Iranian incursions into Iraq. Evidence indicates such
incursions have apparently occurred. For example, Iraq has "confirmed
remarks by a local Kurdish official that one breach of the border had taken
place on April 21[, 2006] in response to rebels attacking Iranian
positions," 67 but Iran and Iraq quickly expressed the intention to jointly
address the issue of securing their borders in May 2006.68 There have also
been reports from the American ambassador to Iraq that "Iran is pressing
Shiite militias to step up attacks against American-led forces in retaliation
for the Israeli assault on Lebanon." 69  The ambassador, however, also
acknowledged that "there was no proof that Iran was directing any
particular operations by militias" in Iraq. 70 Such incidents do not give rise
to a claim of collective self-defense. The I.C.J. distinguished in the
Nicaragua Case mere frontier incidents from armed attacks, finding that
frontier incidents are not sufficiently grave to constitute an armed attack
giving rise to the right of self defense. 71 The Court said that "the concept
of 'armed attack' includes.., acts by armed bands where such acts occur
on a significant scale."7 2 The concern of the International Court of Justice
in Nicaragua was "with collective self-defence, [and specifically,] it
wanted to limit third state involvement" in armed conflict. 73 Given the
relatively insignificant and limited nature of reported Iranian activity on the
Iraqi border, Iraq could not legally invite the United States to exercise
collective self-defense against Iran. Iraq may respond to such incidents
with counter-measures, 74 but as of late 2006 it had not even closed the
border with Iran.
75
Further, even if the incursions were sufficient to meet the test of
significance and control, it is for Iraq to request assistance in defending
itself from Iran. The U.S. cannot simply take measures sua sponte. The
United States is not the victim of these wrongs. The U.S. is in Iraq at the
67. Reuters, Iraq Says Iran Breached Border Twice in April, May 2, 2006,
http://www.iranfocus.com/modules /news/article.php?storyid=7023.
68. See generally John F. Bums, Iran and Iraq to Join to Seal Borders Against
Insurgents, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2006, at 14. Bums reports that Iran and Iraq plan to form a
joint commission to control their borders and to thwart the efforts of groups threatening the
security of the two nations.
69. Edward Wong, U.S. Ambassador in Iraq Says Iran is Inciting Attacks, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 12, 2006, at 7.
70. Id.
71. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 103, para. 195.
72. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 103-04, para. 195 (emphasis added).
73. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 133 (2000).
74. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 110-11, para. 211 & 127, para. 249.
75. Marc Santora, Tough Security Rules Imposed in Baghdad New Bit to Counter
Sectarian Violence, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 15, 2007, 2007 WLNR 2993023.
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invitation of the Iraqi leadership. Attacks in Iraq, even on Americans, are
still attacks against Iraq. Therefore, Iraq is the state with the legal authority
to respond to such wrongs. The Iraqi leadership's close ties to Iran make it
unlikely that Iraq will invite the U.S. to attack Iran.
Professor Maggs also suggests the U.S. could aid Israel owing to
attacks on it by Hezbollah.76 U.S. allegations that Iran may be linked to
Hezbollah were aired publicly in the summer of 2006. 77 These alleged
links, however, appear to be insufficient to give rise to a right of collective
self-defense. For example, some reports have speculated that "Iran may
have passed on the technology [for lethal shaped-charged explosives to
Iraqi militias] via Hezbollah' '78 and former UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan also named Iran as a supporter of Hezbollah: "Hezbollah maintains
close ties, with frequent contacts and regular communication, with the
Syrian Arab Republic and the Islamic Republic of Iran." 79 These reports
do not indicate either that Hezbollah has carried out attacks of a sufficiently
significant nature or that Iran exercises the requisite control over Hezbollah
to be responsible for its actions. Under Nicaragua, confirmed in 2007 by
I.C.J. in the Bosnia v. Serbia case, responsibility requires control:
The first issue raised by this argument is whether it is possible in
principle to attribute to a State conduct of persons - or groups of persons
- who, while they do not have the legal status of State organs, in fact act
under such strict control by the State that they must be treated as its
organs for purposes of the necessary attribution leading to the State's
responsibility for an internationally wrongful act. The Court has in fact
already addressed this question, and given an answer to it in principle, in
its Judgment of 27 June 1986 in the case concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America) (Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 62-64).
In paragraph 109 of that Judgment the Court stated that it had to
"determine.. .whether or not the relationship of the contras to the
United States Government was so much one of dependence on the one
side and control on the other that it would be right to equate the contras,
for legal purposes, with an organ of the United States Government, or as
acting on behalf of that Government" (p. 62).80
76. Maggs, supra note 65.
77. See Wong, supra note 69. Wong reports that "[u]ntil now [August 20061,
American officials have not publicly drawn a direct connection between Shiite militant
groups here and Hezbollah in Lebanon." Id.
78. Id.
79. William M. Reilly, UN Says Iran Aids Hezbollah, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Apr. 23,
2006, http://www.free-lebanon.com/LFPNews/2006/April/April23/april23.html.
80. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
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Unless the United States and its allies produce clear and convincing
evidence that Iran is legally responsible for Hezbollah attacks, the case for
collective self-defense fails. Further, as with Iraq, Israel would have to
formally request U.S. assistance and report to the Security Council. 81
Again, even if a case for collective self-defense could be made, and
was reported, the United States may only join in efforts to end the activity
giving rise to the right of self-defense. It could not use force for some
entirely different purpose in Iran. The United States could not bomb
nuclear research sites to end either incursions into Iraq or the financing and
training of armed militant groups attacking Israel. It is true that a state may
have reasons other than self-defense for joining in a use of force, but the
force used must have a necessary link to the lawful basis. For example,
when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, the United States had the right to
join it in collective self-defense. The United States likely had other reasons
apart from the liberation of Kuwait when it did so. It could have been
motivated to assist Kuwait to ensure steady oil supplies. But the United
States was restricted to actions aimed at liberating Kuwait, regardless of its
motivations, because the liberation of Kuwait provided the lawful basis of
its actions. The United States could not take over Iraq's oil fields or
overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein. Those measures were not
necessary to the liberation and could not have been justified under the
necessity and proportionality aspects of the law on resort to force.82 States
may have mixed motives for a resort to force. However, they may not
bootstrap a legal basis for using force in one situation to an unrelated one.
In distinction to the right of states to act in individual and collective
self-defense, the Security Council has a broader right to use force than
states acting without Council authorization. Nevertheless, on the facts of
the Iran situation, the Council would be hard-pressed to find it necessary to
use military force to force Iran's compliance with the NPT. Iran's nuclear
research sites are scattered throughout the country and are typically buried
deep underground. How force could be useful is unclear. More
importantly, several of the dispersed sites are located near heavily-
populated areas. The death and injury of innocent civilians and damage to
metropolitan centers would, in all likelihood, be heavily disproportionate to
the value of the objective, especially when diplomatic means and measures
Genocide, (Bosnia v. Serbia, 2007 I.C.J., para. 391 available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf).
81. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 120-23, paras. 232-35.
82. Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enforcing the Prohibition on the Use of Force: The U.N. 's
Response to Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 453, 479-80 (1991).
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short of force have not been exhausted.83
Too many discussions of the use of force fail to consider the
principles of necessity and proportionality 84 and how they restrain the right
to resort to force. These principles are especially important in a case like
that of Iran and are the focus of the remainder of this article. With respect
to the principle of necessity:
While military necessity does grant military planners a certain degree of
freedom of judgment about the appropriate tactics for carrying out a
military operation, "it can never justify a degree of violence which
exceeds the level which is strictly necessary to ensure the success of a
particular operation in a particular case."
85
Given all that is not known, ensuring success in such an operation is
impossible. Allegations of an Iranian program to develop nuclear weapons
remain largely unsubstantiated. By late 2006, Iran had not complied with
the UN Security Council's "deadline to freeze all nuclear fuel enrichment"
and "the United Nations nuclear agency is having increasing difficulty
monitoring Iran's activities," 86 still, as stated above, 87 there is no
conclusive evidence of "diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices." 88 In fact some evidence being put
forward of such a program is misleading: "The International Atomic
Energy Agency has complained about a staff report from the U.S. House of
Representatives Intelligence Committee, saying that it 'contains erroneous,
misleading and unsubstantiated information' about Iran's nuclear
program." 89 The IAEA's letter charges that a caption under a picture of
83. As late as May 30, 2006, IAEA Director General El Baradei noted that "[t]here is
no imminent threat [posed by Iran]... there is no clear and present danger... we still have
lots of time to investigate that, we still have lots of time to negotiate with Iran and with the
international community." See Sammy Salama & Elizabeth Salch, Iran's Nuclear Impasse:
Give Negotiations a Chance (June 10, 2006), http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/060602.htm
(quoting Nuclear Proliferation Challenges and Nonproliferation Opportunities-A
Conversation with Dr. Mohammed El Baradei, (May 30, 2006),
http://cns.miis.edu/cns/media/pr060531_transcript.htm); see also Jean de Preez & Insook
Kim, Mohamed El Baradei Calls for a New Global Security Landscape,
http://cns.miis.edu/cns/media/pr060531.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
84. GARDAM, supra note 32, at 21.
85. Human Rights Watch, Jenin: IDF Military Activities, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, May
2002, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/israel3/israel0502.pdf (quoting
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 396 (Yves
Sandoz et al. eds., 1987)).
86. See Sciolino et al., supra note 1.
87. See supra note 1.
88. IAEA Director General Report, supra note 8, at 11.
89. David E. Sanger, Nuclear Agency For U.N. Faults Report on Iran By US. House,
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Iran's main nuclear site at Natanz falsely states that Tehran is "enriching
uranium to weapons grade" with a small collection of centrifuges, the high-
speed machines that are used to turn uranium into a fuel usable in nuclear
power plants--or bombs. The letter says the uranium was enriched only to
3.6 percent-a level suitable for producing power, but far short of the 90
percent or so commonly associated with fuel for weapons.
90
According to David Albright and Corey Hinderstein of the Institute
for Science and International Security, "[r]ecent comments by U.S.
officials about Iran's timeline to develop nuclear weapons differ from
official, community-wide U.S. intelligence assessments." 91 In his February
2006, testimony before the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee, John
Negroponte, Director of National Intelligence, stated that "Iran is judged as
probably having neither a nuclear weapon nor the necessary fissile material
for a weapon." 92 According to the "worst-case" scenarios outlined by
Albright and Hinderstein, moreover, "Iran appears to need at least three
years before it could have enough [highly enriched uranium] to make a
nuclear weapon. Given the technical difficulty of the task, it could take
Iran much longer."
93
A June 2006 Center for Nonproliferation Studies report, corroborating
the technical difficulties that Iran may encounter developing nuclear
technology, concludes that "impediments facing Iran's mastery of the
nuclear fuel cycle demonstrate that the threat of Iranian acquisition of
nuclear weapons capability remains long-term and at this point does not
warrant excessive alarm or military action." 94 Authors Salama and Salch
maintain "that Tehran may still face[] substantial hurdles to the
construction of a nuclear explosive device" because of limited uranium
mining, ineffective "conver[sion of] yellowcake (concentrated uranium
oxide) to uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6)" to feed centrifuges, and a
budding nuclear program not yet technically equipped to accurately and
efficiently produce large quantities of enriched uranium required to create
WMDs. 95 According to Seymour Hersh:
The Administration's planning for a military attack on Iran was made far
more complicated earlier this fall [2006] by a highly classified draft
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2006, at A3.
90. Id.
91. David Albright & Corey Hinderstein, The Clock is Ticking, But How Fast?, The
Institute for Science and International Security, Mar. 27, 2006, at 1, available at
http://www.isisonline.org/publications/iran/clockticking.pdf.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2.
94. Salama & Salch, supra note 83, at 10.
95. Id. at 8-9.
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assessment by the C.I.A. challenging the White House's assumptions
about how close Iran might be to building a nuclear bomb. The C.I.A.
found no conclusive evidence, as yet, of a secret Iranian nuclear-
weapons program running parallel to the civilian operations that Iran has
declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency.
96
"The report 'Would Air Strikes Work?' written by a leading British
weapons scientist, says air strikes would probably be unable to hit enough
targets to cause serious damage to Iran's nuclear facilities." 97  The
evidence simply does not exist that Iran will pose a threat to the
international community such that the Security Council could authorize the
use of force in line with the principle of necessity. Indeed, even if the
research program did pose such a threat, "Iran's uranium enrichment
program is spread out; it is believed some facilities are underground at
unknown locations. There would be no guarantee of ending the
program." 98  Former Pentagon analysts have agreed that "there are no
effective military ways to wipe out a nuclear program that has been well
hidden and broadly dispersed across the country, including in crowded
cities."9 9 Air strikes would not be an effective response. Strikes would
have little impact on the research program.
The principle of proportionality then requires assessment of the means
to accomplish the legitimate objective. Will the cost of achieving that
objective in terms of civilian lives lost and destruction of civilian property
and the natural environment exceed the value of the objective?' 0 0 As
discussed above, bombing will have little value slowing the nuclear
research program. Thus, any attack would disproportionately injure the
nation's civilian population. 101
Iran's nuclear research centers around seven geographic locations:
Tehran, Lashkar Ab'ad, Natanz, Arak, Isfahan, Saghand in the Yazd
96. Hersh, The Next Act, supra note 1, at 101.
97. Kate Kelland, Air Strikes on Iran could Backfire - Report, REUTERS, Mar. 5, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL0366765.
98. Trudy Rubin, Iran Sounds Like a Bad Rerun Administration's Hints Show It's
Learned Nothing From Iraq War, NEWSDAY, Apr. 12, 2006, at A39.
99. Thom Shanker et al., U.S. Wants to Block Iran's Nuclear Ambition, but Diplomacy
Seems to Be the Only Path, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2004, at 18.
100. O'CONNELL, supra note 30, at 278-82.
101. In the case of the Osirak bombing, at least the Israelis knew that destroying the
reactor would slow down Iraq's program. The bombing of Osirak, located outside of
Baghdad, was "apparently done by American-made F-4 Phantoms escorted by F-I5's" and
initial news reports indicated few casualties and limited environmental damage beyond the
nuclear site's infrastructure. David K. Shipler, Israeli Jets Destroy Iraqi Atomic Reactor;
Attack Condemned by U.S. andArab Nations, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1981, at Al.
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Province, and Bushehr.102 Several of these locations are situated in densely
populated areas. 103 The "heart" of a potential nuclear arms program
apparently involves several sites. Arak, a site "believed to be for the
production of heavy water" located about "150 miles southwest of Tehran;"
Bushehr, a complex on the Persian Gulf Coast whose first reactor is
"nearing completion," and Natanz, "located 100 miles southeast of
Tehran," which "will utilize hundreds of gas centrifuges to enrich
uranium." 10 4  Tehran, the capital city, is home to 8,601,473105 of the
country's 68,688,433 106 residents. Given the proximity of two of these key
sites to this major city, it is difficult to see how even a conventional air
attack would not result in significant casualties.
There is also no guarantee that a potential attack would rely on
"conventional" weapons, as in the case of the Osirak. Rather, because Iran
is building facilities underground, 10 7 the use of more powerful weapons
could wreak greater devastation on the civilian population. For example, if
nuclear arms were used, John Burroughs of the Lawyer's Committee on
Nuclear Policy references a
Physicians for Social Responsibility [model of] an attack on the
underground Isfahan nuclear material storage facility in Iran with a 1.2
megaton (1200 kilotons) B83 bomb modified for earth penetration...
[that] found that over three million people would die within 48
hours .... While the yield of the bomb used in the PSR study is far
bigger than that of a bomb likely to be actually used, it still illustrates
that casualties could be very large, as when an attack is in or near an
urban center. A nuclear strike now would likely use the existing
penetrator bomb, the B-6 1-11, a modification deployed by the Clinton
administration in 1997 with little public debate. It is believed to have a
dial-a-yield capability from 300 tons to 300 kilotons. The Hiroshima
bomb was around 12 kilotons.
10 8
To use military force where there is little or no chance of achieving
102. CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, DEADLY ARSENALS, app. A
(2005).
103. Iran Country Profile, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle-east-and-asia/
iranscountry-profile_2004.jpg (last visited Jan. 27, 2007).
104. Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Bird's Eye View: Iran's Nuclear Arms
Program, http://cns.miis.edu/research/iran/images/chOIbig.gif (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
105. Iran-Islamic Republic of Iran, http://www.naturemagics.com/world-
guide/iran.shtm (last visited Mar. 21, 2007).
106. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook-Iran,
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/ir.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
107. Hersh, The Iran Plans, supra note 2.
108. John Burroughs, Hersh's Bombshell, http://disarmamentactivist.org/2006/04/08/
hershs-bombshell/#more-35.
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the military objective but where death and destruction would inevitably
results violates the fundamental international law principles of necessity
and proportionality.
At this point in the discussion, it should not be forgotten that the
international community has other, non-lethal means to encourage
compliance with the NPT. Ukraine and South Africa gave up nuclear
weapons and joined the NPT. Libya suspended its research program. No
military force was needed in any of these cases. Non-military means are
being used in the case of North Korea.
CONCLUSION
Bombing Iranian nuclear research facilities is not supported by either
the international law of self-defense under Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN
Charter or the principles of necessity and proportionality. Under the
current facts, a pre-emptive strike would not have the proper defensive
purpose and, without overt Iranian action, the calculus of necessity and
proportionality would be reckless, undermining the restraint on defensive
force under current international principles. Absent a significant armed
attack, "nonviolent options such as negotiation and verification that a state
does not possess weapons that violate disarmament and nonproliferation
norms should be pursued in all cases of suspected acquisition of weapons
of mass destruction contrary to international law."' 1 9  The global
community can best defend itself by reaffirming its obligation to resolve
disputes by peaceful means as called for in UN Charter Article 2(3) and by
encouraging compliance with the NPT. Indeed, greater compliance by the
United States with international law and greater commitment to the NPT
might go a long way toward re-invigorating the regime of non-proliferation
and norms against possession of nuclear weapons and the unlawful use of
force.
109. Nicole Deller & John Burroughs, Jus ad Bellum: Law Regulating Resort to Force,
HUMAN RIGHTS, (vol. 30, no. 1, 2003) available at http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/winter03/
lawregulatingresorttoforce.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
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